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The Supreme Court’s decision in R  (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 is the most 
eagerly anticipated employment law case of  
the year. This might sound unimportant  
and underwhelming, but the aftershocks of  
this earthquake are far reaching politically, 
socially, and legally. An individual’s ability  
to enforce and uphold the rights given to  
them by the law is the central issue in this 
important case. 
In 2013, the Ministry of Justice introduced 
fees to the employment tribunal, previously  
a free service. In a challenge brought by the  
trade union Unison, the Supreme Court has  
ruled the fees prevent access to justice, are 
unconstitutional, and are discriminatory on 
grounds of gender. A reported £32m in fees paid 
are now set to be refunded, and future claimants 
will no longer have to pay the eye-watering fees. 
The Supreme Court’s decision reiterates  
the importance of the rule of law: that society  
is governed by law and without “unimpeded” 
access to justice (via courts and tribunals) “laws 
are liable to become a dead letter, the work done 
by parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the 
democratic election… a meaningless charade”.  
In concluding, and powerfully rejecting the 
notion that the courts provide a service to “users”, 
valuable only to those users and not society as a 
whole, Lord Reed goes on to say: “That is why  
the courts do not merely provide a public  
service like any other.” Rights which cannot be 
enforced live in law books rather than real life. 
Social benefit
The judgment is a rallying cry for us to treasure our 
legal system, built on “precedent” and the case-by-
case building of legal principle: “every day in the 
courts… the names of people who brought cases 
in the past live on as shorthand for… legal rules 
and principles…”. Noting that the government 
sought to rely on over 60 cases, Lord Reed exposes 
the grim irony of its own arguments: “The Lord 
Chancellor’s own use of these materials refutes the 
idea that taxpayers derive no benefit from the 
cases brought by other people.”
The Supreme Court recognises the skewed 
nature of the employment relationship, stating: 
“Relationships between employers and employees 
are generally characterised by an imbalance of 
economic power.” It is this inequality of bargaining 
power which sets employment law apart, much 
like consumer law. The existence of small 
businesses means not every case is David v Goliath, 
and no doubt small firms are struggling in the 
current climate, but this cannot justify the 
imposition and the crippling level of the fees. 
Whether bringing a claim against a large or 
small company, employees as individuals have 
faced a steep hurdle in being required to pay both 
an issue fee and a hearing fee. Lord Reed reminds 
us why employment rights exist at all, saying: 
“When parliament passes laws creating 
employment rights… it does so not merely to 
confer benefits on individual employees, but 
because it has decided that it is in the public 
interest that these rights should be given effect.”
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The courts do not 
merely provide a 
public service like 
any other
immediately, had set fee levels based on the subject 
matter of the claim; more complex claims require 
more time spent by the tribunal, hence a higher fee. 
Employees faced paying a total of £1,200 for claims 
such as unfair dismissal or unlawful discrimination. 
The Supreme Court note that this “has the effect of 
penalising claimants according to the complexity of 
their claims”, contrasting the position with court 
fees in the county court, where “there is also no 
penalty for bringing a complex claim rather than  
a simple one”. 
Consider being in this situation: you have not been 
paid your wages, you are struggling to pay your bills. 
You’d have to pay £160 to make a claim and £230 to 
have a hearing, just to get back what was due to you. 
Even more counter-intuitively, imagine having to pay 
£250 to bring a claim and £950 for a hearing because 
your employer took action against you for enforcing 
your rights to £7.50 an hour (the minimum wage). 
With “no explanation” for what therefore must  
be an arbitrary disposable capital limit and a 
particularly harsh “gross monthly income test”,  
the Supreme Court notes that a couple on the 
minimum wage, working 40 hours a week, would 
not receive any remission for a “simple” (Type A) 
claim, and only partial remission for a “complex” 
(Type B) claim. The number of people gaining 
remission of fees was “far lower than had been 
anticipated”, exacerbating the harsh effect of the 
imposition of fees. Is it any wonder that the fees 
resulted in “a long-term reduction in claims 
accepted by ETs of the order of 66-70 [per cent]”? 
The Supreme Court formed the clear view that “the 
fall in the number of claims has… been so sharp,  
so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant the 
conclusion that a significant number of people who 
would otherwise have brought claims have found 
the fees to be unaffordable”. 
The Lord Chancellor sought to argue that the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s minimum income 
standards should not apply when considering the 
impact of fees on individuals. This means that, 
effectively, the government was arguing an 
employee should forgo buying clothes, personal 
items, going out, or having a beer or glass of wine for 
perhaps a number of months to bring a claim. The 
Supreme Court noted that “the question arises 
whether the sacrifice of ordinary and reasonable 
expenditure can properly be the price of access to 
one’s rights”. Most people would say it should not be.
Unmeritorious claims
The unaffordability of the fees was not the only 
concern; where fees “render it futile or irrational to 
bring a claim”, they will have the effect of preventing 
access to justice. The unpredictability and poor 
prospects of employees or workers recovering  
fees paid were another factor contributing to the 
unlawful nature of the fees. Even the much-argued 
point that fees would deter “unmeritorious” claims 
fell away, unsupported by either statistics or logic. 
As a matter of principle, individuals should be able 
to make what might not necessarily be a successful 
claim: “the right of access to justice… is not 
restricted to the ability to bring claims which are 
successful. Many people, even if their claims 
ultimately fail, nevertheless have arguable claims 
which they have a right to present for adjudication.” 
Recognising that claims are generally not brought 
lightly, Lord Reed reminds us that “it is necessary to 
bear in mind that the use which people make of ETs 
is governed more by circumstances than by choice. 
Every individual who is in employment may require 
to have resort to an ET, usually unexpectedly…”.
The arguments raised by the Lord Chancellor on 
transferring the cost burden of the tribunal system 
to users from the taxpayer were given short shrift; 
“it is elementary economics, and plain common 
sense, that the revenue derived from the supply of 
services is not maximised by maximising the price,” 
said Lord Reed. 
On issues of proportionality, the stage at which 
the fees are paid and the fact that non-payment 
prevents a case from being tried were considered, 
the conclusion being that “the fees… are in practice 
unaffordable by some people, and… they are so 
high as in practice to prevent even people who  
can afford them from pursing claims for small 
amounts and non-monetary claims”, making  
them disproportionate and contrary to EU law. 
Lady Hale delivered another sucker punch; given 
54 per cent of Type B (complex) claims (on UNISON’s 
figures; the Lord Chancellor submitted 45 per cent) 
and only 37 per cent of Type A (simple) claims are 
brought by women, the higher fees for complex 
claims put women at a particular disadvantage to 
men, which, with the problems set out previously, 
could not be objectively justified. Put simply, the 
fees fall foul of indirect sex discrimination. 
What next?
The fees regime must be dismantled as it is 
unlawful ab initio; it must be quashed. Will the 
tribunals become inundated by chancers hoping 
to obtain large payouts? It is highly unlikely. Wins  
in tribunal cases are noted by the Supreme Court 
to be “modest” financially, and many claims do not 
involve obtaining money at all. Making a claim for 
something as basic as a written statement of your 
particulars of employment (your basic statutory 
and contractual rights) is “vital to the enforcement 
of other employment rights” such as pay, holidays, 
and working time. What we will see is free access to 
the employment tribunal, tempered by ACAS early 
conciliation. Employees will still have to explore 
settlement and discussion before bringing a claim, 
and employers who follow the rules will have 
nothing to fear. SJ
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